Purpose -Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002-2010.
Introduction
Over the past decades, the issue of corruption and the search for strategies to combat its corrosive effects have grown in importance as a topic of public debate and a criterion by which the civil society evaluates leadership. This increased attention is motivated by the realization among international development experts that development requires above all governance quality. Advice on sound policies, well intentioned incentives and aid efforts may not achieve their desired objective unless they are offered in an environment that stimulates self-sustaining growth and development (Jain,2001) . There is also mounting realization that unsustainable policies do not always emerge from a lack of knowledge about what best policies should be.
Rather they could result just as much from decision makers distorting economic policies for their own interest (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Grossman & Helpman, 1994; Krueger 1993a; Krueger 1993b) . Corruption is seen by many as one of the principal impediments to the development of an efficient government system; since it is conceived as a "symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of the state" (Rose-Ackeman,1999, p.9) . Even the public acknowledges at large that corruption is the greatest obstacle to economic development (Jain, 2001) . There is currently a stream of empirical investigations on the causes and consequences of corruption. Though some consensus is slowly emerging on the determinants of corruption across countries, a number of aspects remain unsolved. There is lack of consensus on the ability to measure corrupt activity and the difficulty of quantifying the impact of institutions on controlling corruption (Billger & Goel, 2009 ). The focus of this paper is the later concern.
Today policies in the fight against corruption espoused by national governments and international organizations appear to be similar across countries. Yet the effectiveness of some of these policies remain unclear (Billger & Goel, 2009 ).
The contribution of this paper to the literature is its focus on the distribution of the dependent variable(i.e. control of corruption). Corruption-control determinants and governments' efficacy in combating corruption maybe different across countries such that corrupt and 'clean' countries respond differently to factors that ignite the fight against corruption. This hypothesis begs the question of whether there are different determinants of combating corruption in high corruption-control countries as compared to low corruption-control ones. Thus if existing levels of corruption-control affect how various motives for the fight against corruption come into play, then findings of this paper could have significant implications both for the literature and policy making toward the battle against corrupt practices in Africa. It follows that instead of focusing on groups of countries with common corruption-control measures, policy could instead target groups of countries with the same corruption-control characteristics(high, low or average).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature. Data and methodology are presented and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Existing literature

Theoretical highlights
According to Jain(2001) , corruption requires three preconditions: discretionary power related to regulations(also see Rose-Ackeman, 1978) , economic rents linked to power and sufficiently marginal punishment (Dong et al.,2012) . These are the results of four main theories of corruption. (1) Good and misguided governments formulate systems that are very rigid. Venal bureaucrats shape the rules. Corruption diminishes red-tape and if anything improves allocation efficiency (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968) . (2) Good and smart governments plan systems that are supposed to be rigid. Venal bureaucrats bend the rules and regulations. Corruption reduces bureaucracy and worsens allocation efficiency (Laffont & Tirole, 1993) . (3) Greedy and smart governments make rules that are very lax and allow bureaucrats more discretion than they should have. There is absence of red-tape and no need for any corruption. Allocation efficiency suffers a great deal (Shleifer & Vishny,1993) . (4) Good and smart governments establish rules that make it tempting for the bureaucrat to take money and bend the rules. The bureaucrat introduces redtape in a bid to bend the rules in a way that protects him/her. Corruption and red-tape go hand in glove.
According to Billger & Goel (2009) , the theoretical foundations for corruption studies also draw from the larger literature on the determinants of criminal activity, where rational individuals(bribe-givers, bribe-takers …etc) weigh the relative costs and benefits of criminal(corrupt) acts (Becker, 1968) . Potential benefits of corruption could include disproportionate favors that monopolist bureaucrats maybe able to hand-out (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) or they may involve cutting(accelerating) bureaucratic red-tape (Guriev, 2004) . The differential levels of impatience(discount rates) across economic agents induce some to accept/offer bribes and dictate the size of the bribes. Potential costs of engaging in corrupt endeavors include the cost of apprehension and punishment. Surviving literature does however allow for the possibility that monitoring agencies might themselves be corrupt (Banerjee, 1997) .
Types and levels of corruption: how the stakes involved can influence governance
Given the context of this paper, it is irrelevant to center the debate on the issue of whether corruption is inherently good or bad. It is more useful to determine which types of corruption have the most corrosive effect on social/economic stability(development). Political leadership play a crucial role in promoting/discouraging corrupt activities. To effectively shape this role, it is imperative to move beyond the subjective and qualitative analyses that describe corruption as a mere moral failing of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. Thus it is more useful to consider it as a political and economic phenomenon.
Corruption is prevalent to some degree in all societies. In recent years however political scientists have aggressively sought to understand the reason some nations and societies are clearly more vulnerable to abusive political and economic opportunism than others. In response they have suggested a number of typologies that indicate linkages between the incidences of corruption and specific stages of political, economic and social developments (Kpundeh,1998) .
According to some authors, the types and amounts of corruption vary in accordance with a number of factors affecting the relationship between government and civil society (Johnston, 1982) . For the purpose of explicitly stating the objective of our study, it is useful to categorize the phenomenon into three frameworks: incidental, systematic and systemic corruption as summarized in Table 1 (consistent with Kpundeh(1998) ). Firstly, Incidental corruption is characterized by petty bribery and involves opportunistic individuals or small groups. In this context, corruption is the exception rather than the rule. High-level private sector actors and senior officials seldom bother with such theft. Secondly, Systematic corruption is organized, not necessarily institutionalized or pervasive but recurrent. It usually involves large gains which are often subject to popular scandals. While it is entrenched and functions with a large number of officials, intermediaries and entrepreneurs, this form of corruption originates from high-level civil servants that recognize and exploit the illegal ventures and opportunities in government departments and agencies. Hence, this practice is the direct violation of the rule of law. Thirdly, Systemic corruption is pervasive, institutionalized(perhaps accepted but not necessarily approved), and built into the economic and political institutions. It occurs and flourishes in situations where public sector wages fall below a living-wage. In contrast to systematic corruption, it involves all levels of employment. Bribery and kickbacks, collusion to defraud the public, large-scale embezzlement and misappropriation through public tender and disposal of public property, economic privileges accorded to special interests, large political donations and bribes.
Systemic
Bureaucratic elites, politicians, business men and white-collar workers.
Large-scale embezzlement through 'ghost worker' on government pay roll, embezzling government funds through false procurementpayment for nonexistent goods, large scale disbursement of public property to special and privileged interest under the pretext of 'national interest', favoritism and discrimination exercised in favor of ruling parties in exchange for political contributions.
Source: Kpundeh(1998) Thus from a theoretical standpoint the fight against corruption could be incidental, systematic or systemic. However from a practical standpoint legislation against corruption often encompasses the three types. Our paper focuses indifferently on the three types of corruption. This is because where there is systemic corruption, systematic and incidental corruption are already prevalent; which is the case of most African countries.
Governance and fight against corruption in Africa
An intense debate has raged on for years over Africa's economic woes. Aside from the obvious problems of warfare, drought and disease, the usual suspect is economic policy (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 1997) . Corruption remains the most daunting challenge for majority of African countries. As evidenced by several studies and surveys, it is a major Given both the inability of measuring the true level of corruption and the substantial effort required in creating another index(which could be no better than existing indices), two research avenues have been proposed (Billger & Goel, 2009 ). The first consists of examining additional determinants of corruption (Treisman, 2000) while the second involves employing different estimation techniques (McAdam & Rummel, 2004) . The later strategy is the focus of this paper. This approach enables us to capture the subtle differences in the determinants of corruption-control across 'clean' and 'dirty' countries. Thus an assessment throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption could substantially add to the extant body of knowledge in the corruption-development nexus.
3.Data and Methodology
Data
We assess a panel of 46 countries with updated data (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) from African Development Indicators(ADI) of the World Bank(WB). The dependent variable is the 'control of corruption' indicator; consistent with the corruption literature (Billger & Goel,2009; Okada & Samreth,2012; Asongu,2012) . In this study we use eight control variables: level of economic prosperity, population growth, democracy, regulation quality, political stability, government effectiveness, voice & accountability and rule of law. These variables have been used separately or collectively in the corruption literature (Bardhan,1997; Treisman,2000; Jain,2001; Aidt,2003; Lambdorff,2006; Billger & Goel,2009) . A substantial bulk of research has shown that a politicoeconomic approach stressing the importance of institutions is a powerful tool in understanding corruption (Abed & Gupta,2002; Bradhan,1997; Rose-Ackerman,1997) . Electoral rules and structures substantially affect the corruption level (Kunicova & Rose-Ackeman,2005 ) and countries tend to achieve an equilibrium position that is driven by the balance of political forces and institutions (Bird et al.,2006; Bird et al.,2008) . Beyond these empirical backings in the choice of government-quality control variables, the theoretical underpinnings of the corruption literature point to the central role of good-governance in the fight against the scourge. In plainer terms, the choice of variables is fully justified by theoretical and empirical literature.
Corresponding summary statistics(Appendix 1), correlation analysis(Appendix 2), variable definitions(Appendix 3) and presentation of countries(Appendix 4) are detailed in the appendices.
Beside good-governance determinants, borrowing from Billger & Goel (2009,p.300) , economic prosperity and democracy are standard determinants of corruption. Economic prosperity in the literature (Serra,2006 ) is observed to decrease corruption because from common-sense to some extent economic theory bribe-takers and bribe-givers are lower in wealthier nations, as the propensity to take bribe decreases when growth in national income is equitably distributed. Political competition entrenched in democracy is more likely to exert a positive effect on the fight against corruption because elected officials are required to account for policies and are sanctioned by the electorate if election promises are not kept. A major election promise common to most African countries is the fight against corruption. Government quality enshrined in regulation quality, rule of law, government effectiveness, voice & accountability and political stability(no violence) ensure greater economic and political freedoms which lead to less corruption (Chowdhury, 2004; Goel & Nelson, 2005) . The size of the population is also likely to affect corruption, especially if demographic increase is accompanied with a higher degree of urbanization (Billger & Goel, 2009) . A greater concentration of the population in urban areas is likely to increase their discount rates and greater opportunities for interactions between potential bribe-takers and bribe-givers. Conversely, a highly concentrated urban population might indicate a greater chance of corruption-oversight (Billger & Goel, 2009 ).
Methodology
Borrowing from Billger & Goel (2009) Previous studies on the determinants of corruption are based on Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) estimation, which report parameter estimates at the conditional mean of corruption. While mean effects are certainly important, this study expands such findings using quantile regression. More so, one of the underlying assumptions of OLS regression is that the error term and the dependent variable are normally distributed. However, quantile regression does not require a normally distributed error term. Therefore, based on this technique we are able to carefully assess the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution with particular emphasis on the best and worst fighters of corruption. Quantile regression(QR)
yields parameters estimated at multiple points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) and has gained attention in recent corruption literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) . The θ th quantile estimator of the dependent variable is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem. variable is a highly non-normal pattern (Okada & Samreth, 2012) . We also report results for Least Absolute Deviations(LAD) which should correspond to those of the 0.5 th quantile for robustness purpose.
Empirical analysis
Empirical results
The results presented in Table 2 include OLS, LAD and QR estimates. OLS estimates provide a baseline of mean effects and we compare these to estimates of LAD and separate quantiles in the conditional distributions of the dependent variable. In the interpretation of the signs of estimated coefficients, note should be taken of the fact that smaller values(in conditional distributions) of the dependent variable denote less corruption-control.
In the OLS regressions, greater economic prosperity lowers corruption-control in all cases. This finding could be elucidated from two perspectives: (1) Quantile regressions results reveal that the effect of economic prosperity(GDP growth) is consistent in sign(whether significant or not) across specifications and across quantiles. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption-control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. This implies that everything being constant, similar growth levels across countries will reduce motivation in the fight against corruption at higher quantiles: countries where corruption-control is already high. In comparison with the findings from OLS, the sign of quantile estimates is consistent, with the magnitude of the effect of economic prosperity increasing across quantiles(from the smallest to the highest).
But for specification 3, the effect of population growth is negative across quantiles and other specifications: consistent with the OLS estimates. However, the magnitude of the effect of positive demographic change does not reveal consistent results. While in specifications 2 and 5 the negative magnitude increases from the 0.10 th to the 0.50 th quantiles then decreases subsequently, a corresponding general decrease in magnitude is observed for specifications 1 and 4. Thus in a combined interpretation of specifications, 1, 2, 4 and 5, within the top half of the conditional distribution(among countries with more corruption control) the negative effect of population growth on the fight against corruption has lower magnitudes.
The effect of democracy is almost always positive, confirming the position that political freedoms create conditions that monitor corrupt activities (Goel & Nelson, 2005; Serra, 2006) . 
Discussion, policy implications and limitations
The fight against corruption remains an important priority in policy making bodies in the African continent. In our findings, OLS estimates correspond(stricto sensu) at times to just a specific quantile of the conditional distribution. This difference suggests that some policies based on OLS should be reconsidered, especially across the best and worst fighters of corruption.
Based on the findings, the following policy implications result. Common to all conditional corruption-control distribution strands is the issue of 'political will' in the implementation of reforms. Most African countries already have well established corruption control policies. However, their implementation and enforcement is another issue and remains a matter of political will. We shall outline some aspects that need to be accounted for if the reforms and policies we have suggested are to yield any fruits.
(1) The fight against corruption cannot be a 'one man show' and relegated uniquely to political leadership. Anticorruption strategies are effective if they are inclusive, systematic and structured; that is to say integrating all institutions and policies(investigation, prosecution research and prevention). Such institutionalization develops a forum of mutually reinforcing 'horizontal accountability' which inhibits reforms from being perceived as partisan issues or 'witch hunts'. (2) Administrations could establish public confidence through regular updates in press conferences that reveal strides that are being made towards reducing wrongdoing, increasing accountability and transparency. (3) The independence of the anti-corruption body set-up by government is also paramount for the success of reform strategies. In Hong-Kong and Singapore for instance, the effectiveness and success of anti-corruption institutions are directly related to their degree of autonomy. If the independent bodies are answerable to parliament rather than the head of state, this could improve their effectiveness.
An important limitation worth taking into account is that studies of this kind depend to a great deal on the integrity of the proxy for corruption obtained from perception-based measures.
Thus omitted variables and media-effect may significantly influence perceptions of corruptioncontrol. However, to the best of our knowledge there are no better indicators of corruptioncontrol than those from African Development Indicators of the World Bank.
5.Conclusion
Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries?
Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? This paper has In summary the rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already more seriously engaged in the corruption fight. This implies there is a reward to 'experience' in the battle against corruption, meaning laggard countries in this fight will definitely benefit less in time when common policies are instituted by all countries. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed, doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. 
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